Whom are you hiding your history from?
Is it an attacker must have access to your home directory and can read your "dot" configuration files and other material. Why don't you just use permissions to keep them out?
Is the attacker an administrator, not kept out by permissions? (Either has root, or unfettered access to system backups that contain your home directory and so on.) In that case, why specifically worry about your Bash history? You have no privacy on that system. The attacker can spy on the memory in your running processes.
Is your machine locally secured (accessible only by you), but your home directory is mounted on a networked file system? In that case, why don't you use an encrypted file system layer over that networked mount, so that all your files are protected together, not just your Bash history.
As you can see, there is hardly any use case for the whack-a-mole approach to file security (leaving it to each individual application to protect specific files).