D
Size: a a a
2020 April 26
D
3д!
ну так 3д вроде большего качества кабеля требовали чем просто хдми
а 4к ещё больше
а 4к ещё больше
NA
мм кабеля)
И
Если , что то на что пробивает, то можно вольтметром это всё проверить, а не кутилулами :). И очень непонятно, куда утикает то ?. Вы на батарее сидите или что ?
Дома полный голяк. Недавно переехал, а тут такие приколы.
D
Замена HDMI кабеля не помогла. Проблема начал возникать и при отключенной зарядке. Не помню что бы было с моим тонким, длинным китайским HDMI.
так кабель на кабель нет смысла менять
у каждого кабеля есть экран
у каждого кабеля есть экран
D
с вайфай 2.4 есть проблемы когда юсб 3+ используется
И
так кабель на кабель нет смысла менять
у каждого кабеля есть экран
у каждого кабеля есть экран
подумал что кабель был перебит немного когда я стол устанавливал.
И
с вайфай 2.4 есть проблемы когда юсб 3+ используется
Можно подробнее? В связи с чем?
D
Можно подробнее? В связи с чем?
2020 April 27
LF
А может просто емкость на маме потекла... Не окончательно пока, вот и тараканит
ЗБ
Virtual Lab: Bare-metal Reverse Engineering & Hardware Hacking - Thomas Roth & Dmitry Nedospasov
Part 1: Bare-metal reverse engineering with Ghidra
After a brief introduction to bare-metal code and the ARM Cortex-M architecture we jump right into reverse-engineering ARM firmware. First, we analyze some simple crackmes, look at some useful scripts and tools and learn some tricks to efficiently navigate firmware. Next, we’ll analyze the actual BootROM of a popular series of microcontroller and identify an attack vector for a low-level hardware attack. Participants are welcome to ask questions and encouraged to follow along. Please join the HITB #virtuallab channel on Slack
Part 2: Glitching for fun and profit
After Identifying the potential vulnerability in Ghidra, we will now devise a strategy to exploit this vulnerability in the underlying hardware. This will include, preparing the ARM microcontroller for the attack, wiring up the circuit to induce the fault and programming an FPGA to control the system boot and perform the attack in real time. And, instead of just showing slides on how such an attack could be performed, we will solder it live, running through all the issues together and answering questions as we go along.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VNzKVOsn5qQ&t=30621
Part 1: Bare-metal reverse engineering with Ghidra
After a brief introduction to bare-metal code and the ARM Cortex-M architecture we jump right into reverse-engineering ARM firmware. First, we analyze some simple crackmes, look at some useful scripts and tools and learn some tricks to efficiently navigate firmware. Next, we’ll analyze the actual BootROM of a popular series of microcontroller and identify an attack vector for a low-level hardware attack. Participants are welcome to ask questions and encouraged to follow along. Please join the HITB #virtuallab channel on Slack
Part 2: Glitching for fun and profit
After Identifying the potential vulnerability in Ghidra, we will now devise a strategy to exploit this vulnerability in the underlying hardware. This will include, preparing the ARM microcontroller for the attack, wiring up the circuit to induce the fault and programming an FPGA to control the system boot and perform the attack in real time. And, instead of just showing slides on how such an attack could be performed, we will solder it live, running through all the issues together and answering questions as we go along.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VNzKVOsn5qQ&t=30621
2020 April 28
ЗБ
Microcontroller Readback Protection: Bypasses and Defenses
Microcontrollers commonly include features to prevent the readout of sensitive information in internal storage. Such features are commonly referred to as readback protection or readout protection. This paper describes common readback protection implementation flaws, discusses techniques that can be used to defeat readback protection, and provides guidance to implement effective readback protection.
https://research.nccgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/NCC-Group-Whitepaper-Microcontroller-Readback-Protection-1.pdf
Microcontrollers commonly include features to prevent the readout of sensitive information in internal storage. Such features are commonly referred to as readback protection or readout protection. This paper describes common readback protection implementation flaws, discusses techniques that can be used to defeat readback protection, and provides guidance to implement effective readback protection.
https://research.nccgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/NCC-Group-Whitepaper-Microcontroller-Readback-Protection-1.pdf