Recent studies have suggested various side-channel attacks for eavesdropping sound by analyzing the side effects of sound waves on nearby objects (e.g., a bag of chips and window) and devices (e.g., motion sensors). These methods pose a great threat to privacy, however they are limited in one of the

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Device-independent quantum key distribution provides security even when the equipment used to communicate over the quantum channel is largely uncharacterized. An experimental demonstration of device-independent quantum key distribution is however challenging. A central obstacle in photonic implementations is that the global detection efficiency, i.e., the probability that the signals sent over the quantum channel are successfully received, must be above a certain threshold. We here propose a method to significantly relax this threshold, while maintaining provable device-independent security. This is achieved with a protocol that adds artificial noise, which cannot be known or controlled by an adversary, to the initial measurement data (the raw key). Focusing on a realistic photonic setup using a source based on spontaneous parametric down conversion, we give explicit bounds on the minimal required global detection efficiency.

Russian developer and antifascist activist Viktor Filinkov has used his last word in court to explain the persecutor how #PGP encryption works.

Using email encryption does not make you a terrorist!

Today Mr. Filinkov explained SMTP and PGP to a russian court in St Petersburg in his "last words" ... it's clear this developer is a good human being because he avoided IMAP! Bad joke aside: it is a chilling dangerous development if e2e tooling is seen as evidence for terrorism. https://t.co/GBcAtzMhC5